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Abstract
Over the past decade, side-channels have proven to be
significant and practical threats to modern computing
systems. Recent attacks have all exploited the un-
derlying shared hardware. While practical, mounting
such a complicated attack is still akin to listening
on a private conversation in a crowded train station.
The attacker has to either perform significant manual
labor or use AI systems to automate the process. The
recent academic literature points to the latter option.
With the abundance of cheap computing power and
the improvements made in AI, it is quite advantageous
to automate such tasks. By using AI systems how-
ever, malicious parties also inherit their weaknesses.
One such weakness is undoubtedly the vulnerability
to adversarial samples.
In contrast to the previous literature, for the first
time, we propose the use of adversarial learning as a
defensive tool to obfuscate and mask private informa-
tion. We demonstrate the viability of this approach
by first training CNNs and other machine learning
classifiers on leakage trace of different processes. After
training highly accurate models (99+% accuracy), we
investigate their resolve against adversarial learning
methods. By applying minimal perturbations to input
traces, the adversarial traffic by the defender can run
as an attachment to the original process and cloak it
against a malicious classifier.
Finally, we investigate whether an attacker can
protect her classifier model by employing adversar-
ial defense methods, namely adversarial re-training
and defensive distillation. Our results show that even
in the presence of an intelligent adversary that em-
ploys such techniques, all 10 of the tested adversarial
learning methods still manage to successfully craft
adversarial perturbations and the proposed cloaking
methodology succeeds.
1 Introduction
Deep Learning (DL) has proven to be a very power-
ful tool for a variety of tasks like handwritten digit
recognition, image classification and labeling, speech
recognition, lip reading, verbal reasoning, self driv-
ing cars, playing competitive video games and even
writing novels [27, 54, 21, 70, 26, 4, 69, 39, 41, 67, 47].
As expected with any booming technology, it is also
utilized by malicious actors. For instance, there have
been cases of AI-generated content on the Internet
boards to create or shift public opinion by social en-
gineering. The latest and the most notorious known
example being the AI generated fake comments on
the FCC net-neutrality boards where millions of fake
messages were posted [33, 61]. These AI-crafted mes-
sages were grammatically and semantically sound and
not easily detectable as fake by a human observer.
Yet another malicious use of AI is for Spam and
phishing attacks. Using the sentiment analysis power
of well-trained models, hackers are now crafting tailor-
made phishing e-mails that have higher ‘yield’ rates
than human crafted phishing e-mails [59, 17]. Espe-
cially with the abundance of cheap computing power,
bulk creation of such e-mails has become easier than
ever. Beyond crafting semantically sound text, mod-
ern AI system can even participate in hacking com-
petitions where human creativity and intuition was
thought to be irreplaceable. In 2016, DARPA spon-
sored a hacking competition for AI systems alone. The
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competition task was to find and fix vulnerabilities
in computer systems within a given time period [34].
Moreover, according to a survey among cybersecurity
experts, the use of AI for cyberattacks will become
more common with time and the use of AI on cyber-
attacks is inevitable [64].
As evident by the mass surge of AI use in cyber-
attacks, AI is now a tool in hackers’ toolbox and
there needs to be systems in place against such AI
capable attackers. Expanding on this thought, we in-
vestigate the problem with the focus on side-channel
attacks. Side-channel attacks in general deal with
bulk amounts of noisy data that requires human in-
terpretation and intuition to process. Such task are
perfectly suited for AI systems and it is reasonable to
expect that malicious parties are aware of this oppor-
tunity. We believe that the use of AI in side-channel
attacks is a realistic and practical expectation. The
academic literature already shows the use of AI for
processing side-channel leakage.
In 2011 Hospodar et al. [29] demonstrated the first
use of machine learning, LS-SVM specifically, on a
power side-channel attack on AES and showed that
the ML approach yields better results than the tra-
ditional template attacks. Later, Heuser et al. [28]
showed the superiority of multi-class SVM for noisy
data in comparison to the template attacks. Also
in 2012, Zhang et al. [72] demonstrated the use of
multi-class SVM to extract RSA decryption keys from
noisy side-channel leakage data. In addition to SVMs,
Neural Networks (NN) are also a popular tool among
side-channel researchers. Martinasek et al. [44, 43]
showed that NNs could be used to classify AES keys
from power measurements with a success rate of 96%.
Moreover, in 2015 Beltramelli [5] used LSTM NN
to collect meaningful keystroke data via motions of
the smart watch user. In 2016, Maghrebi et al. [42]
compared four DL based techniques with template
attacks to attack an unprotected AES implementa-
tion using power consumption and showed that CNN
outperforms template attacks. Finally in 2017, Gul-
mezoglu et al. [25] showed that machine learning can
be used to extract meaningful information from cache
side-channel leakage to recover web traffic of users.
The easiest countermeasure against side-channel
attacks is to drown the sensitive computation leak-
age in noise to cloak it from the attacker. However,
this defense has proven to be ineffective in addition
to being computationally expensive with significant
performance overhead. In this study, we argue that
we can do much better than the random noise. By
using adversarial methods, we can craft much smaller,
intelligent noise to accompany processes rather than
costly random noise. By using AL, we achieve a bet-
ter cloaking effect with much smaller changes to the
trace hence causing minimal overhead to the system.
Also, the proposed defense does not require the re-
design of the software or the hardware stacks, making
it practically deployable. In addition to that, it can
be deployed as an opt-in service that users can enable
or disable at wish, depending on their privacy needs
at the time.
In summary, as stated in [19], attacking machine
learning is easier than defending it. Therefore if used
strategically in a non-traditional way i.e. as a defen-
sive countermeasure, the adversarial learning (AL)
against malicious parties with AI capabilities can be
quite advantageous. In this work expand this idea
and show that AL is indeed a useful defensive tool to
cloak private processes from AI capable adversaries.
Our Contribution
This work propose a framework and explore all the
necessary steps to successfully cloak processes against
side-channel attacks as well as the defenses a malicious
party can use to bypass the cloaking. More specifically
in this paper we;
• show that crypto processes can be profiled with
high accuracy via their side-channel leakage us-
ing deep learning and various classical machine
learning models. We classify 20 types of processes
using readily available, high resolution Hardware
Performance Counters (HPC). Further, we in-
vestigate the effect of parameter choices like the
number of features, samples and data collection
intervals on the accuracy of such classifiers.
• present the use of adversarial learning methods to
craft perturbations and add them to the system
hardware trace to cloak the side-channel leakage
of private processes. We show that this is a strong
defense against an attacker using DL classifiers.
• test and quantify the efficiency of different adver-
sarial learning methods against leakage classifiers
and present the quality and applicability of each
attack.
• show that even when adversarial defense methods
such as adversarial re-training and defensive dis-
tillation are employed by the attacker, adversarial
perturbations still manage to cloak the process
in many settings.
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2 Background
In this section, we provide the necessary background
information to better understand the attack, adver-
sarial sample crafting as a countermeasure and the
improved attack. More specifically, we go over mi-
croarchitectural attacks, Hardware Performance Coun-
ters, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), and AL
attacks.
2.1 Microarchitectural Attacks
Over the last decade, there has been a surge of mi-
croarchitectural attacks. Low-level hardware bot-
tlenecks and performance optimizations have shown
to allow processes running on shared hardware to
influence and retrieve information about one an-
other. For instance, cache side-channel attacks
like Prime&Probe and Flush+Reload exploit the
cache and memory access time difference to recover
fine-grain secret information [55, 48, 68, 24]. In
fact, researchers have shown that through this leak-
age, it is possible to recover secret cryptographic
keys [6, 73, 74, 32, 31, 23, 37, 56, 22]. In these works,
the attacker exploits microarchitectural leakages stem-
ming from memory access time variations, e.g. when
the data is retrieved from small but faster caches as
opposed to slower DRAM memory.
2.2 Hardware Performance Counters
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs), or Hard-
ware Performance Events, are special purpose registers
that provide low-level execution metrics directly from
the CPU. This low-level information is particularly
useful during software development to detect and mit-
igate performance bottlenecks before deployment. For
instance, the low number of cache hits and the high
number of memory accesses can hint to an improp-
erly ordered loop. By re-ordering some operations, a
developer can significantly improve the performance
of the program. While there is many different HPCs,
availability of a specific counter depends on the spe-
cific CPU model. Moreover, the number of HPCs
that can be monitored simultaneously depends both
on the CPU model and the selected HPCs. Since
some HPCs are derived from others, their use puts
additional limitations to the monitoring process.
In addition to performance optimization, HPCs
are also proven to be useful at runtime to provide
system health check and/or anomaly detection. For
instance, in [1] Alam et al. leverages perf_event API
to detect microarchitectural side-channel attacks. In
2009, Lee et al. [71] showed that HPCs can be used on
cloud systems to provide real-time side-channel attack
detection. In [11, 12] researchers have shown that
HPCs can be used to detect cache attacks. Moreover,
Allaf et al. [2] used a neural network, decision tree,
and kNN to specifically detect Flush+Reload and
Prime&Probe attacks on AES.
Moreover, researchers have shown that by using
the fine-grain information provided by HPCs, it is
possible to violate personal privacy as well. In [25],
Gulmezoglu et al. shows that HPC traces can be used
to reveal the visited websites in a system. The attack
relies on machine learning techniques such as auto-
encoder, SVM, kNN and decision trees and works even
on privacy conscious Tor browser.
2.3 Preventing Microarchitectural
Leakage
Side channel leakages through microarchitectural fea-
tures, whether measured via cache access profiles, by
monitoring branch predictors, or directly via HPCs,
can be prevented. The most effective technique is
constant-time implementation, where execution behav-
ior must be independent of sensitive inputs. Several
tools to validate constant-time properties have been
proposed, e.g. Langley’s ctgrind, ct-verif [3] and
CacheD [66]. Raccoon [57] automates the enforcement
of a constant-time control flow. Yet, the adoption rate
of constant-time implementation is low even for cryp-
tographic libraries, and probably not even considered
for other applications. Besides requiring increased de-
velopment effort, constant-time implementations often
have significantly decreased average-case performance.
Alternatives that reduce side-channel leakage at lower
overheads use sophisticated randomization techniques,
e.g. software diversity [15], where programs randomly
choose from various different implementations of the
same functionality or simply access random memory
locations during run time [75]. While often more effi-
cient than constant-time code, none of the designs are
optimized to minimize the overhead while maximizing
the obfuscation effect of the countermeasure.
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2.4 Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is a supervised
feed-forward artificial neural network architecture.
The supervised learning simply means that the data
used to train the model is labeled. Other than labeling,
training a CNN requires minimal human intervention
and is easily automatable.
The biggest advantage of the CNN is that it does
not saturate easily and can reach unprecedented ac-
curacy levels with more training data. Unlike the
classical machine learning methods, CNNs do not re-
quire data features to be identified and pre-processed
before training. Instead, CNNs discover and learn rel-
evant features in the data without human intervention,
making them very suitable for automated tasks. The
fact that features do not need to be extracted manu-
ally offers great flexibility and makes CNNs the go-to
classifier for processing large amounts of unlabeled
data.
The disadvantage of the CNN on the other hand
is the requirement for large amounts of data and the
computationally expensive training process compared
to the classical ML models. Even so, in the past 5
years, decent number of results show that CNNs can
surpass humans in certain tasks which only a decade
ago were considered nearly impossible to automate.
This breakthrough is fueled by the rapid increase
in GPU powered parallel processing power and the
advancements in deep learning.
In the past decade, CNNs have been very success-
fully applied to image, malware and many other clas-
sification problems. Training a CNN model is done in
3 phases. First, the labeled dataset is split into three
parts; training, validation and test data. Then the
training data is fed to the CNN with initial hyper-
parameters and the classification accuracy is measured
using the validation dataset. Guided by the validation
accuracy results, the hyper-parameters are updated to
increase the accuracy of the model while maintaining
its generality. After the model achieves the desired
hyper-parameter optimization level, it is tested with
the test data and the final accuracy of the model is
obtained.
2.5 Adversarial Learning
AL is a subfield of machine learning that studies the ro-
bustness of trained models under adversarial settings.
The problem stems from the underlying assumption
that the training and the test data comes from the
same source are consistent in their features. Studies
have shown however that by introducing some small
external noise or in this context what is commonly
referred to as adversarial perturbations, it is pos-
sible to craft adversarial samples and manipulate the
output of machine learning models. In other words, by
carefully crafting small perturbations, one can push
a test sample from the boundaries of one class to an-
other. Moreover, due to the mathematical properties
of the high-dimensional space that the classifier op-
erates in, very small perturbations can be enough to
push a sample to other classes. AL refers to the group
of techniques that are used to perturb test samples to
classifiers and force misclassification. While there are
many different methods of crafting such perturbations,
ideally they are desired to be minimal and not easily
detectable.
Adversarial attacks on classical machine learning
classifiers (under both white-box and black-box sce-
narios) have been known for quite some time [40, 36,
30, 9, 76, 10, 7, 8]. However, it was Szegedy et al. [62]
that first introduced AL attacks on DNNs. In the 2013
study, they show that very small perturbations that
are indistinguishable to human eye can indeed fool
CNN image classifiers like ImageNet. The perturba-
tions in the study are calculated using the technique
called Limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno (L-BFGS). This algorithm searches in the
variable space to find parameter vectors (perturba-
tion) that can successfully fool the classifier. Later in
2014, Goodfellow et al. [20] improved the attack by
using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to effi-
ciently craft minimally different adversarial samples.
Unlike the L-BFGS method, the FGSM is computa-
tionally conservative and allows much faster pertur-
bation crafting.
In 2016, Papernot et al. [51] further improved upon
Goodfellow’s FGSM by using Jacobian saliency maps
to craft adversarial samples. Unlike the previous
attacks, the jacobian saliency map attack (JSMA)
does not modify randomly selected data points or
pixels in an image. Instead, it finds the points of
high importance with regards to the classifier decision
and then modifies these specific pixels. These points
are found by taking the Jacobian matrix of the loss
function given a specific input sample. The JSMA
allows an attacker to craft adversarial samples by
modifying fewer data points in comparison to FGSM.
In 2016 [35, 38, 49], multiple new adversarial at-
tacks were discovered. Moreover, the research showed
that these adversarial samples are transferable i.e.
perturbations that can fool a model can also work on
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other models trained on the same task. In [50], Pa-
pernot et al. showed that adversarial attacks can also
succeed under the black-box attack scenario where an
attacker has only access to the classification labels. In
this scenario, the attacker has no access to the model
parameters such as weights, biases, classification con-
fidence or the loss, therefore, cannot directly compute
or use the gradients to craft a perturbation. Instead,
the attacker uses the target model as an oracle that
labels the inputs and then uses these labeled images
to train her own classifier. Authors demonstrated
the feasibility of the attack on MetaMind and Deep
Neural Network (DNN) classifiers hosted by Amazon
and Google. With 84.24, 96.19 and 88.94% misclassi-
fication rates respectively, they were able to fool the
targeted classifiers.
In [16], researchers have shown that by iteratively
morphing a structured input, it is possible to craft
adversarial samples under black-box attack scenario.
Authors have implemented the attack against a PDF
malware classifier and have reported 100% evasion
rate. Moreover, the study acknowledges the fact that
black-box attack model has a cost of obtaining labeled
data from observations and defines and uses a cost
function that takes into account the number of obser-
vations. The attack works by adding and/or removing
compilable objects to the PDF. Black-box scenario
does not assume to obtain confidence scores from the
model under attack, only the class output.
In summary, the AL is an active research area with
plethora of new attacks, defenses and application cases
emerging daily [65, 18, 46, 13, 60].
3 Methodology
Our goal is to show that side channel classifiers—
especially complex and powerful DL-based classifiers—
can be successfully stopped using the concept of AL.
Tho validate this assumption, we first train DL-based
classifiers using real side-channel data, and show their
degradation as the result of AL techniques, even if the
DL-based classifier is aware of the AL based cloaking
defense. In our experiments, we take the following
steps:
1. Training the process classifier C using side-
channel leakage Ω
2. Crafting adversarial samples δ to cloak the user
processes and force C to misclassify.
3. Training a new classifier C′ with adversarial de-
fense methods; Defensive Distillation and Adver-
sarial Re-training.
4. Testing previously crafted adversarial samples δ
against the new classifier C′. Also crafting and
testing new adversarial samples δ′ against the
protected classifier C′.
We outline this methodology in Figure 1. In the
first stage, Alice the defender runs a privacy sensitive
process X. The eavesdropper Eve collects the side-
channel leakage Ω and feeds it into her classifier C
and discovers what type of process X is. Then in stage
2, Alice cloaks her process by crafting the adversarial
sample δ. When faced with this adversarial sample,
Eve’s classifier C fails and misclassifies the leakage
trace as X ′. In the third stage, Eve trains a new clas-
sifier C′ using defensive distillation and adversarial
re-training to protect it from misclassification cause
by the adversarial perturbation δ. In the final stage,
Alice first tests previously crafted adversarial samples
against Eve’s protected classifier C′. Then, Alice up-
dates her adversarial sample crafting target to fool C′
rather than the original classifier C.
We apply this methodology to a scenario where a
malicious party trains a Deep Neural Network (DNN)
to classify running processes using the HPC trace
as the input. This information is extremely useful
to the attacker since it helps to choose a specific
attack or even pick a vulnerable target among others.
Once a vulnerable target is found, an attacker then
can perform microarchitectural or application specific
attacks. To circumvent this information leakage and
protect processes, the defender attempts to mask the
process signature. This masking should not interfere
with the running process and should not create too
much overhead to the overall system performance.
This is why crafting minimal adversarial perturbations
is crucial to the practicality of the defense.
The attacker periodically collects five HPC values
for 10 milliseconds total with 10-microsecond intervals.
This results in a total of 5000 data points per trace.
Later, this trace is fed into classical machine learning
and DL classifiers. In this section, we explain our
choice of the specific HPCs, the application classifier
design and implementation details, the AL attacks
applied to these classifiers and finally test the efficiency
of adversarial defenses against our cloaking method.
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Figure 1: The outline of the cloaking methodology. Alice, the defender runs the process X and leaks the
Ω. Eve, the attacker obtains the leakage and identifies the process X using the classifier, C. Then, Alice
crafts the adversarial perturbation δ and forces C to misclassify the trace as X′. Eve then trains C′ with
adversarial re-training and defensive distillation. Now, Eve can classify δ′ +Ω partially correct. However,
when Alice crafts δ′ against C′, X is again misclassified.
3.1 HPC Profiling
HPCs are special purpose registers that provide de-
tailed information on low-level hardware events in
computer systems. These counters periodically count
specified event like cache accesses, branches, TLB
misses and many others. This information is intended
to be used by developers and system administrators
to monitor and fine-tune performance of applications.
The availability of a specific counter depends on the
architecture and model of the CPU. Among many
available HPCs, we have selected the following 5 for
the classification task;
1. Total Instructions: the total number of retired
i.e. executed and completed CPU instructions.
2. Branch Instructions: the number of branch
instructions (both taken and not taken).
3. Total Cache References: the total number of
L1, L2, and L3 cache hits and misses.
4. L1 Instruction Cache Miss: the occurrence
of L1 cache instruction cache misses.
5. L1 Data Cache Miss: the occurrence of L1
cache data cache misses.
We have selected these HPCs to cover a wide variety
of hardware events with both coarse and fine-grain
information. For instance, the Total Instructions
does not directly provide any information about the
type of the instructions being executed. However, dif-
ferent instructions execute in varying number of cycles
even if the data is loaded from the same cache level.
This execution time difference translates indirectly
into the total instructions executed in the given time
period and hints about the instruction being executed.
The Branch Instructions HPC provides valuable
information about the execution flow as well. Whether
the branches are taken or not taken, the total number
of branches in the executed program remains constant
for a given execution path. This constant in the leak-
age trace helps eliminate noise elements and increases
classification accuracy.
The Total Cache References HPC provides simi-
lar information to the Branch Instructions HPC in the
sense that it does not leak information about the finer
details like the specific cache set or even the cache
level. However it carries information regarding the
total memory access trace of the program. Regardless
of the data being loaded from the CPU cache or the
memory, the total number of cache references will
remain the same for a given process.
The L1 Instruction Cache Miss and the L1
Data Cache Miss HPCs provide fine-grain informa-
tion about the Cold Start misses on the L1 cache.
Since the L1 cache is small, the data in this cache level
is constantly replaced with new data, incrementing
these counters. Moreover, separate counters for the
instruction and the data misses allows the profiler to
distinguish between arithmetic and memory intensive
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operations and increases the profiler accuracy. Finally,
all five of the HPCs are interval counters meaning that
they count specific hardware events within selected
time periods.
3.2 Classifier Design and Implementa-
tion
In the first part of the study, we design and imple-
ment classifiers that can identify processes using the
HPC leakage. To show the viability of such classi-
fier, we chose 20 different ciphers from the OpenSSL
1.1.0 library as the classification target. Note that
these classes include ciphers with both very similar
and extremely different performance traces e.g. AES-
128, ECDSAB571, ECDSAP521, RC2 and RC2-CBC.
Moreover, we also trained models to detect the version
of the OpenSSL library for a given cipher. For this
task, we used OpenSSL versions 0.9.8, 1.0.0, 1.0.1,
1.0.2 and 1.1.0. The full list of classified processes is
given in Appendix A.2.
3.2.1 Classical Machine Learning Classifiers:
In this study, we refer to non-neural network classifica-
tion methods as classical machine learning classifiers.
In order to compare and contrast classical machine
learning methods with CNNs, we trained a number
of different classifiers using the Matlab Classification
Learning Toolbox. The trained classifiers include
SVMs, decision trees, kNNs and variety of ensemble
methods.
3.2.2 Deep Learning Classifier:
We designed and implemented the CNN classifier us-
ing Keras with Tensorflow-GPU back-end. The model
has the total of 12 layers including the normalization
and the dropout layers. In the input layer, the first
convolution layer, there are a total of 5000 neurons to
accommodate the 10 milliseconds of leakage data with
5000 HPC data points. Since the network is moder-
ately deep but extremely wide, we used 2 convolution
and 2 MaxPool layers to reduce the number dimen-
sions and extract meaningful feature representations
from the raw trace.
In addition to convolution and MaxPool layers, we
used batch normalization layers to normalize the data
from different HPC traces. This is a crucial step since
the hardware leakage trace is heavily dependent on
the system load and scales with overall performance.
Due to this dependency, the average execution time
of a process or parts of a process can vary from one
execution to another. Moreover, in the system-wide
leakage collection scenario, the model would train
over this system load when it should be treated as
noise. If not handled properly, the noise and the
shifts in the time domain results in overfitting the
training data with the dominant average execution
time, decreasing the classification rate. By using
the batch normalization layer, the model learns the
features within short time intervals and the relation
between different HPC traces. On the output layer we
use 20 neurons with softmax activation, representing
20 classes of processes. Finally, we use Categorical
Cross-entropy loss function with the Adam Optimizer
to train the model.
Our CNN classifier is constructed using the layers
given below;
1. Convolution layer (50, (10,1))
2. MaxPool Layer (10,1)
3. Batch Normalization Layer
4. Dropout Layer (0.25)
5. Convolution Layer (100, (10,1))
6. MaxPool Layer (10,1)
7. Batch Normalization Layer
8. Dropout Layer (0.25)
9. Flatten Layer
10. Dense Layer (400)
11. Dropout Layer (0.25)
12. Dense Layer (20)
3.3 Adversarial Learning Attacks
AL remains an important open research problem in AI.
Traditionally, AL is used to fool AI classifiers and test
model robustness against malicious inputs. In this
study however, we propose to use AL as a defensive
tool to mask the side-channel trace of applications
and protect against microarchitectural attacks and
privacy violations. In the following, we explain the
specific adversarial attacks that we have used. We
consider the following 10 attacks:
• Additive Gaussian Noise Attack (AGNA):
Adds Gaussian Noise to the input trace to cause
misclassification. The standard deviation of the
noise is increased until the misclassification criteria
is met. This AL attack method is ideal to be
used in the cloaking defense due to the ease of
implementation of the all-additive perturbations. A
sister-process can actuate such additional changes
in the side-channel trace by simply performing
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operations that increment specific counters like
cache accesses or branch instructions.
• Additive Uniform Noise Attack (AUNA):
Adds uniform noise to the input trace. The stan-
dard deviation of the noise is increased until the
misclassification criteria is met. Like the AGNA,
this attack is also easy to implement as a sister-
process due to its additive property.
• Blended Uniform Noise Attack (BUNA):
Blends the input trace with Uniform Noise until
the misclassification criteria is met.
• Contrast Reduction Attack (CRA): Calcu-
lates perturbations by reducing the ‘contrast’ of
the input trace until a misclassification occurs. In
case of the side-channel leakage trace, the attack
smooths parts of the original trace and reduces the
distance between the minimum and the maximum
data points.
• Gradient Attack (GA): Creates a perturbation
with the loss gradient with regards to the input
trace. The magnitude of the added gradient is
increased until the misclassification criteria is met.
The attack only works when the model has a gra-
dient.
• Gaussian Blur Attack (GBA): Adds Gaussian
Blur to the input trace until a misclassification
occurs. Gaussian blur smooths the input trace and
reduces the amplitude of outliers. Moreover, this
method reduces the resolution of the trace and
cloaks the fine-grain leakage.
• GSA (Gradient Sign Attack) [20]: Also called
the Fast Gradient Sign Method, the attack has been
proposed by Goodfellow et al. in 2014. GSA works
by adding the sign of the elements of the gradient
of the cost function with regards to the input trace.
The gradient sign is then multiplied with a small
constant that is increased until a misclassification
occurs.
• L-BFGS-B Attack (LBFGSA) [63]: The
attack utilizes the modified Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm, an iterative method
for solving unconstrained nonlinear optimization
problems, to craft perturbations that have minimal
distance to the original trace. The attack morphs
the input to a specific class. However, in our ex-
periments, we did not target a specific class and
chose random classes as the target.
• Saliency Map Attack (SMA) [53]: The SMA
works by calculating the forward derivative of the
model to build an adversarial saliency map. This
map reveals which input features e.g. pixels in an
image, have a stronger effect on the targeted mis-
classification. Using this information, an adversary
can modify only the features with high impact on
the output and produce minimal perturbations.
• Salt and Pepper Noise Attack (SPNA):
Works by adding Salt and Pepper noise (also called
impulse noise) to the input trace until a misclas-
sification occurs. For images, salt and pepper val-
ues correspond to white and black pixels respec-
tively. For the side-channel leakage trace however,
these values correspond to the upper and the lower
bounds in the trace.
3.4 Adversarial Learning Defenses
In order to see the viability of any defense method
that can be used by an attacker against our adver-
sarial perturbations, we have explored two methods:
adversarial re-training and defensive distillation (DD).
These defenses are an integral part of this study since
an attacker capable of overcoming adversarial pertur-
bation would deem any cloaking mechanism moot.
3.4.1 Gradient Masking:
The term gradient masking defense has been intro-
duced in [50] to represent group of defense methods
against adversarial samples. The defense works by
hiding the gradient information from the attacker to
prevent it from crafting adversarial samples. Papernot
et al. [50] however showed that the method fail under
the oracle access scenario. An attacker can query
the classifier with enough samples to create a cloned
classifier. Since the clone and the original classifiers
have correlated gradients, the attacker can use the
gradient from the clone and craft adversarial samples,
bypassing the defense. Due to the known weaknesses
and limitations of this defense method, we do not
further investigate it in this study.
3.4.2 Adversarial Re-training:
This defense idea was first proposed by Szegedy et al.
in 2013 [62]. Later in 2014, Goodfellow et al. [20] im-
proved the practicality of the method by showing how
to craft adversarial samples efficiently using the Fast
Gradient Sign Method. In this defense, the model
is re-trained using adversarial samples. By doing so,
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the model is ‘vaccinated’ against adversarial perturba-
tions and can correctly classify them. In other words,
the method aims to teach adversarial perturbations
to the model so that it can generalize better and not
be fooled by small perturbations. While this method
works successfully against a specific type of attack, it
has been shown to fail against attack methods that
the model was not trained for. Nevertheless, we apply
this defense method to our classifiers and investigate
its applicability to side-channel leakage classifiers.
3.4.3 Defensive Distillation:
The DD has been proposed by Papernot et al. [49] in
2016 to protect DL models against AL attacks. The
goal of this technique is to increase the entropy of
the prediction vector to protect the model from being
easily fooled. The method works by pre-training a
model with a custom output layer. Normally, the
softmax temperature is set to be as small as possible
to train a tightly fitted, highly accurate model. In
the custom layer however, the temperature value is
set to a higher value to distill the probability outputs.
The first model is trained with the training data us-
ing hard labels i.e. the correct class label is set to
‘1’ and all other class labels are set to ‘0’. After the
model is trained, the training samples are fed into
it and the probability outputs are recorded as soft
labels. Then these soft labels are used to train the
second, distilled model with the same training data.
This process smooths the model surface on directions
that an adversary would use to craft perturbations.
This smoothing process increases the perturbation
size required to craft an adversarial samples and in-
validates some of the previously crafted adversarial
samples. This smoothing can be set to different levels
by adjusting the temperature value. Note that how-
ever, the DD can reduce the classification accuracy
significantly if the temperature value is set too high.
4 Experiment Setup and Re-
sults
In this section, we give details of our experiment
setup, and the results of different adversarial attacks
on the crypto-process classifier, and finally present
the results of hardened adversarially re-trained and
distilled models.
4.0.1 Experiment Setup:
DL models perform mammoth amounts of matrix
multiplications that can be parallelized well in modern
GPU systems. For that reason, we used a workstation
with two Nvidia 1080Ti (Pascal architecture) GPUs,
20-core Intel i7-7900X CPU and 64 GB of RAM. On
the software side, the classifier model is coded using
Keras v2.1.3 with Tensorflow-GPU v1.4.1 back-end
and other Python3 packages such as Numpy v1.14.0,
Pandas, Sci-kit, H5py etc.
The HPC data is collected from a server with Intel
Xeon E5-2670 v2 CPU running Ubuntu 16 LTS. This
specific CPU model has 85 possible hardware events
of which 50 are available to user-space. To access the
HPCs, we had the choice of using Perf and PAPI
libraries. Due to the lower sampling rate of Perf, we
chose to use the PAPI with QuickHPC [14] front-end.
QuickHPC is a tool developed by Marco Chiappetta
to collect high-resolution HPC data using the PAPI
back-end. It is over 30000 times faster than perf-stat
and provides an easy to use interface.
4.1 Classification Results
The classifiers are trained to identify 20 classes repre-
senting a diverse set of different ciphers of five different
versions of OpenSSL, as detailed in Section 3.2.
4.1.1 CNN Classifier:
For the CNN classifier, we firstly investigated the
effect of the number of HPCs collected and trained
our models for 100 epochs with data from a varying
number of HPCs. Not surprisingly, even with only
1 HPC, our CNN classifier achieved 81% validation
accuracy, although after a high number of epochs.
Moreover, we noticed that after the 30th epoch, the
model overfitted the training data i.e. the validation
accuracy started to drop while the training accuracy
kept increasing. When we increased the number of
HPCs collected, our models became much more ac-
curate and achieved over 99% validation accuracy as
seen in Figure 3. Moreover, when we use the data
from all 5 HPCs, our model achieved 99.8% validation
accuracy in less than 20 epochs. While our validation
accuracy saturates even with only 2 HPCs, Total In-
structions and Branch Instructions we have decided
to use all 5 of them. We made this decision because
in a real-world attack scenario, an attacker might be
using any one or more of the HPCs. Since it would
not be known which specific hardware event(s) an
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Figure 2: Results for the CNN classifier trained using
varying number of features. Models reach highest
validation accuracy with 1000 and 2000 features.
attacker would monitor, we decided to use all 5, mon-
itoring different low level hardware events to provide
a comprehensive cloaking coverage.
To find the optimum number of features per HPC,
we have trained multiple models with using various
number of features. As shown in Figure 2, the vali-
dation accuracy saturates at 1000 and 2000 features,
validation loss drops after 1000 features. For this rea-
son, we chose to use 1000 features for our experiments.
After deciding to use data from 5 HPCs, we investi-
gated how the number of training samples affect the
CNN classifier validation accuracy. For that, we have
trained 6 models with a varying number of training
samples. For the first model, we have used only 100
samples per class (2000 samples in total) and later on
trained models with 300, 1000, 3000, 10000 and 30000
samples per class. In the first model, we achieved
99.8% validation accuracy after 40 epochs of training.
When we trained models with more data, we have
reached similar accuracy levels in much fewer epochs.
To make a good trade-off between the dataset size
and training time, we have opted to use 1000 samples
per class. This model reaches 100% accuracy with 20
epochs of training as shown in Figure 4. Finally, our
last model achieved 100% accuracy just after 4 epochs
when trained with 30000 samples per class. Additional
results on varying number samples are presented in
Appendix 6.
We also verified that different versions of OpenSSL
can be distinguished for each cipher. For each of the
20 analyzed ciphers, we built classifiers to identify to
which of the five analyzed versions they belong. Fig-
ure 5 presents the classification results of two models
trained using 1 and 5 HPC traces respectively. More
results with 2,3 and 4 HPCs are presented in Ap-
pendix A.3. As cipher updates between versions can
Table 1: Application classification results for the clas-
sical machine learning classifiers with and without
PCA feature reduction.
Classification Method Without With PCA
PCA (99.5% variance)
Fine Tree 98.7 99.9
Medium Tree 85.4 94.8
Coarse Tree 24.9 25
Linear Discriminant 99.6 99.7
Quadratic Discriminant N/A 99.4
Linear SVM 99.9 98.2
Quadratic SVM 99.9 96.9
Cubic SVM 99.9 94.3
Fine Gaussian SVM 40 88.2
Medium Gaussian SVM 98.3 92.1
Coarse Gaussian SVM 99.7 13.4
Fine kNN 96.8 11.1
Medium kNN 94.9 7.8
Coarse kNN 85.5 5.2
Cosine kNN 92.5 19.6
Cubic kNN 85.2 7.7
Weighted kNN 95.9 8.3
Boosted Trees 99.2 99.8
Bagged Trees 99.9 94.8
Subspace Discriminant 99.8 99.7
Subspace kNN 84.8 88.1
RUSBoosted Trees 76 92.8
Best 99.9 99.9
be very small, the added information from sampling
several HPCs is essential for high classification rates,
as can be seen from the results.
4.1.2 Classical Machine Learning Methods:
In our training of ML classifiers, the first challenge
was the fact that the side-channel leakage data is
extremely wide. We have chosen to train our mod-
els using 1000 data points per HPC with 5 HPCs
monitored simultaneously. This parameter selection
is done empirically to provide wide cloaking cover-
age and train highly accurate models as explained in
Section 4.1.1. Using 1000 data points with 10 micro-
second intervals per HPC allowed us to obtain high
quality data in a short observation window. Neverthe-
less, 5000 dimensions is unusually high for classifiers,
especially considering that we are training multi-class
classifiers with 20 possible classes.
In order to find optimal settings for the hardware
leakage trace, we tried different parameters with each
classifier. For instance in the case of decision trees,
we have trained the ‘Fine Tree’, ‘Medium Tree’ and
‘Coarse Tree’ classifiers. The difference between these
classifiers is that respectively they allow 5, 20, and 100
splits (leaves in the decision tree) to better distinguish
between classes. For the case of Gaussian SVM, fine,
medium and coarse refers to the kernel scale set to
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Figure 3: Results of CNN classifiers trained with varying number of HPCs. Even using data from a single
HPC trace is enough to obtain high accuracy top-1 classification rates, albeit taking longer to train.
sqrt(P)/4, sqrt(P) and sqrt(P)*4 respectively. As
for the kNN, the parameters refer to the number of
neighbors and the different distance metrics. More
detailed description of these classifiers is provided in
Appendix A.1.
Results for the classical ML classifiers are given in
Table 1. Classic machine learning algorithms achieve
very high success rates for the given classification
task. The trained models can in fact classify running
processes by using their HPC traces. Note that the
Quadratic Discriminant did not converge to a solution
without the PCA application hence no score is given
in the table.
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Figure 4: Results of CNN classifier trained using 100 and 30000 samples per class, in order. First, the model
is trained with 100 samples per class for about 40 epochs to reach 99% accuracy. When we increase the
number of samples per class to 1000, we achieve same accuracy in about 20 epochs of training.
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Figure 5: Results of the CNN trained for OpenSSL version detection, using varying number of HPCs. When
trained with only a single HPC trace, the validation accuracy the model saturates at 61%. When the data
from 5 HPCs are used, validation accuracy reaches 99%.
4.2 AL on the Unprotected Model
Next, we crafted adversarial perturbations for the un-
protected classifiers by using and adapting the publicly
available Foolbox [58] library to our scenario. The
library provides numerous adversarial attacks and
provides an easy to use API. For a selected attack,
Foolbox crafts necessary perturbations on a given
sample and classifier model pair to ‘fool’ the given
model. Detailed information about these attacks can
be found in Section 3.3.
Table 3 presents the classification accuracy of per-
turbed samples. As the results show, almost all test
samples are misclassified by the classifier model with
very high accuracy at over 86%. Another important
metric for the adversarial learning is the Mean Abso-
lute Distance (MAD) and the Mean Squared Distance
(MSD) of the perturbed traces from the originals.
These metrics quantify the size of the changes i.e.
perturbations made to the original traces by various
adversarial attack methods. The difference between
the MAD and the MSD is that, the latter is more
sensitive to the larger changes due to the square op-
eration. For instance, if an adversarial perturbation
requires a significant change in 1 sample point among
the 5000 features, it will have a stronger impact in the
final MSD value than average change distributed over
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few points. MAD however is more dependent on the
overall change in the trace, i.e. all 5000 sample points
have the same impact on the final distance. Results
show that with most adversarial attacks, perturbation
MAD is around or well below 1% and within the ideal
range. As noted earlier, the smaller the perturbation,
easier it is to actuate it.
4.3 AL on the Hardened Models
Here we present the results of the AL attacks on the
hardened classifier models. As explained in Section 3,
we wanted to test the robustness of our cloaking mech-
anism against classifiers hardened with Adversarial
Re-training and DD. To recap the scenario, Alice the
defender wants to cloak her process by adding pertur-
bations to her execution trace so that eavesdropper
Eve cannot correctly classify what Alice is running.
Then Eve notices or predicts the use of adversarial
perturbations on the data and hardens her classifier
model against AL attacks using adversarial re-training
and DD.
In order to test the attack scenario on hardened
models, we first craft 100,000 adversarial samples
per adversarial attack type against the unprotected
classifier. Then, we harden the classifier with the
aforementioned defense methods and feed the previ-
ously successful adversarial samples. Here, we aim
to measure the level of protection provided by the
adversarial re-training and the DD methods.
As presented in Table 2, the application of both
the adversarial re-training and the DD invalidates
some portion of the previously crafted adversarial
samples. For the adversarial re-training, the success
rate varies between 99% (GSA) and 4% (SPNA). In
other words, 99% of the adversarial samples crafted
using GSA against the unprotected model are invalid
on the hardened model. As for the DD, we see similar
rates of protection ranging from 61% up to 100% for
old perturbations. Impressively, 100% of the adversar-
ial samples crafted using the BUNA are now ineffective
against the model trained with DD at temperature
T=100.
In short, by using the adversarial re-training or
the DD, Eve can indeed harden her classifier against
AL. However, keep in mind that Alice can observe or
predict this behavior and introduce new adversarial
samples targeting the hardened models. Below, we
discuss the results of our experiments against such
hardened models.
4.3.1 Adversarial Re-training:
After training the DL classifier model and crafting
adversarial samples, we use these perturbations as
training data and re-train the classifier. The moti-
vation here is to teach the classifier model to detect
these perturbed samples and correctly classify them.
With this re-training stage, we expect to see whether
we can ‘immunize’ the classifier model against given
adversarial attacks. However, as the results in Table 3
show, all of the adversarial attacks still succeed albeit
requiring marginally larger perturbations. Moreover,
while we observe a drop in the misclassification con-
fidence, it is still quite high at over 63% i.e. Eve’s
classifier can be fooled by adversarial samples.
4.3.2 Defensive Distillation:
We have used the technique proposed in [52] and
trained hardened models with DD at various tem-
peratures ranging from 1 to 100. Our results show
that, even if the eavesdropper Eve hardens her model
with DD, the trained model is still prone to adver-
sarial attacks albeit requiring larger perturbations in
some cases. In Table 4, we present the MAD i.e. the
perturbation size, of various attack methods on both
unprotected and hardened models. Our results show
that the application of DD indeed offers a certain level
of hardening to the model and increases the perturba-
tion sizes. However this behavior is erratic compared
to the adversarial re-training defense i.e. the MAD is
significantly higher at some temperatures while much
smaller for others. For instance, the MAD for the
AUNA perturbations against the unprotected model
is 0.00292 in average for 100,000 adversarial samples.
The perturbation size for the same attack drops to
0.00033 when the distillation defense is applied with
temperature T=1. This in turn practically makes
Eve’s classifier model easier to fool. Same behavior
is observed with the adversarial samples crafted us-
ing AGNA and GBA as well. For the cases that the
DD actually hardens Eve’s model against adversar-
ial samples, the MAD is still minimal. Hence, Alice
can still successfully craft adversarial samples with
minimal perturbations and fool Eve’s model. Finally,
NA values in Table 4 represent cases where the model
that had very low classification accuracy and could
not correctly classify original samples.
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Table 2: Effectiveness of adversarial re-training and DD on 100,000 adversarial samples. The results show what
percentage of previously successful adversarial samples are ineffective on the hardened models. Adversarial
re-training is most effective against the GSA and least effective on SPNA. As for the DD, the protection
changes with the distillation temperature and ranges between 32% and 99%.
Adversarial
Attack
Adversarial
Re-training
DD with
T=1
DD with
T=2
DD with
T=5
DD with
T=10
DD with
T=20
DD with
T=30
DD with
T=40
DD with
T=50
DD with
T=100
AGNA 42 77 60 70 83 83 63 64 62 75
AUNA 43 77 60 70 83 82 63 65 61 75
BUNA 94 92 92 91 94 94 94 96 94 100
CRA 94 95 99 94 94 94 94 99 88 95
GA 97 99 72 83 99 99 96 80 90 90
GBA 84 83 84 88 82 94 93 91 93 88
GSA 99 91 90 91 99 99 99 95 99 98
LBFGSA 51 76 63 63 78 87 65 65 63 71
SMA 26 71 50 52 62 82 49 47 32 48
SPNA 4 84 76 78 94 93 76 79 73 80
Table 3: Perturbation results against both the unprotected and the hardened (Adversarial Re-training) CNN
classifier. The new adversarial samples have up to 29% lower misclassification confidence compared to the
unprotected model. However, new adversarial samples are still misclassified with quite high confidence values
in the range of 63-98%.
Unprotected Classifier Hardened Classifier (Adv. Re-training)
Adversarial
Attack
Original Sample
Classification
Confidence
Adversarial
MisClassification
Confidence
Perturbation
Size (MAD)
Original Sample
Classification
Confidence
Adversarial
MisClassification
Confidence
Perturbation
Size (MAD)
AGNA 99 96 0.00294 92 82 0.00294
AUNA 99 97 0.00292 91 82 0.00332
BUNA 99 99 0.05000 96 93 0.05000
CRA 99 99 0.05254 97 98 0.04999
GA 99 99 0.00250 88 97 0.00398
GBA 99 97 0.00080 93 74 0.00071
GSA 99 99 0.00499 89 97 0.00596
LBFGSA 99 86 0.00025 89 72 0.00031
SMA 99 92 0.00001 88 63 0.00008
SPNA 99 96 0.01528 92 74 0.08268
Table 4: MADs of adversarial perturbations crafted against the DD applied classifier. The application of
adversarial re-training and DD only marginally increases the perturbation size needed to fool the classifier in
most cases. In almost all cases, adversarial samples with MAD of less than 1% is enough to fool the model,
with the exception three.
Adversarial
Attack
Unprotected
Model
Adversarial
Re-trained
DD with
T=1
DD with
T=2
DD with
T=5
DD with
T=10
DD with
T=20
DD with
T=30
DD with
T=40
DD with
T=50
DD with
T=100
AGNA 0.00294 0.00294 0.00035 0.00265 0.00062 0.01059 0.01389 0.00452 0.00766 0.01797 0.00431
AUNA 0.00292 0.00332 0.00033 0.00238 0.00071 0.01114 0.01336 0.00514 0.00948 0.01787 0.00451
BUNA 0.05000 0.05000 0.04989 0.05301 0.08198 0.10293 7.52282 0.05006 0.05002 0.16376 0.07748
CRA 0.05254 0.04999 0.04999 0.10247 0.08548 0.10780 NA 0.04998 1.44158 0.27992 0.07448
GA 0.00250 0.00398 0.00355 0.00283 0.10224 0.00783 0.00364 0.00860 2.75805 0.00849 0.00303
GBA 0.00080 0.00071 0.00058 0.00092 0.00060 0.04992 NA 0.00169 0.00046 0.00062 0.00083
GSA 0.00499 0.00596 0.00504 0.00534 0.13665 0.02482 0.00540 0.01064 0.04121 0.01670 0.00550
LBFGSA 0.00025 0.00031 0.00533 0.00178 0.00024 0.00210 0.07670 0.00088 0.02872 0.00521 0.00920
SMA 0.00001 0.00008 0.00003 0.00012 0.00007 NA NA 0.00001 0.00001 NA NA
SPNA 0.01528 0.08268 0.01060 0.00940 0.00360 0.01804 0.02000 0.00260 0.02000 0.02000 0.01980
5 Conclusion
Side-channel leakage on shared hardware systems pose
a real and present danger to the security and the pri-
vacy of users. Even when the software is perfectly
isolated, co-resident tenants still share the underlying
hardware and are prone to side-channel attacks. Espe-
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cially considering the wide adoption of AI across many
disciplines, it is not surprising that such attacks will
become automated and even easier to perform in the
future. There is a clear need for users to cloak their
execution fingerprints from the underlying shared sys-
tem.
With this work we took a first step in this direc-
tion. Specifically, by making clever defensive use of
adversarial crafting we introduced a new cloaking
defense against the side-channel leakage classifiers.
We first demonstrated the threat side-channel leakage
poses by processing leakage profiles to yield highly ac-
curate AI models which may be used by an adversary
to violate privacy and security policies of applications.
We trained various types of classifiers including the
classical machine learning methods and showed how
the parameter selection affects the learning rate and
the validation accuracy. While this is a strong threat
to shared hardware systems, we showed that it can
be mitigated using carefully crafted adversarial sam-
ples. Moreover, we investigated defenses that can
potentially help an attack to bypass the adversarial
samples. Our results show that even in the presence of
defensive distillation and adversarial re-training, the
defender can craft working adversarial samples and
fool the attacker. These perturbations can be imple-
mented as a sister-process that will run side-by-side
with the original and easily cause misclassification to
the attacker’s model without any significant overhead.
If systems deploy the adversarial crafting-based
cloaking mechanism that we have outlined in this work,
users can enable such services on-demand for sensitive
operations. Efficient design and implementation of
such defenses for shared hardware systems like cloud
remains an open research problem. Finally, to the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first use
of adversarial crafting for defensive purposes.
We envision the same approach to be useful in other
application scenarios.
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A Appendix
A.1 Classical Machine Learning Meth-
ods
The following is the full list of the classical machine
learning methods used in the study.
• Fine Tree
• Medium Tree
• Coarse Tree
• Linear Discriminant
• Quadratic Discriminant
• Linear SVM
• Quadratic SVM
• Cubic SVM
• Fine Gaussian SVM
• Medium Gaussian SVM
• Coarse Gaussian SVM
• Fine kNN
• Medium kNN
• Coarse kNN
• Cosine kNN
• Cubic kNN
• Weighted kNN
• Boosted Trees
• Bagged Trees
• Subspace Discriminant
• Subspace kNN
• RUSBoosted Trees
The following descriptions about the classifiers are
taken from Mathworks webpage [45].
Decision Tree: are easy to interpret, fast for fit-
ting and prediction, and low on memory usage, but
they can have low predictive accuracy. Try to grow
simpler trees to prevent overfitting. Control the depth
with the Maximum number of splits setting.
Discriminant Analysis: is a popular first clas-
sification algorithm to try because it is fast, accu-
rate and easy to interpret. Discriminant analysis is
good for wide datasets. Discriminant analysis assumes
that different classes generate data based on different
Gaussian distributions. To train a classifier, the fit-
ting function estimates the parameters of a Gaussian
distribution for each class.
SVM: classifies data by finding the best hyperplane
that separates data points of one class from those of
the other class. The best hyperplane for an SVM
means the one with the largest margin between the
two classes. Margin means the maximal width of the
slab parallel to the hyperplane that has no interior
data points.
kNN: typically have good predictive accuracy in
low dimensions, but might not in high dimensions.
They have high memory usage, and are not easy to
interpret. kNN classification is basically categorizing
query points based on their distance to points (or
neighbors) in a training dataset can be a simple yet
effective way of classifying new points. You can use
various metrics to determine the distance. Given a set
X of n points and a distance function, k-nearest neigh-
bor (kNN) search lets you find the k closest points
in X to a query point or set of points. kNN-based
algorithms are widely used as benchmark machine
learning rules.
Ensemble classifiers: Combine results from
many weak classifiers into one high-quality ensemble
model. Qualities depend on the choice of algorithm.
All ensemble classifiers tend to be slow to fit because
they often need many learners.
A.2 List of the Profiled Applications
The following is the full list of applications used as
the test classes in our experiments.
1. AES-128-CBC
2. BF-CBC
3. BLOWFISH
4. CAMELLIA-128-CBC
5. DES-CBC
6. DES-EDE3
7. DSA2048
8. ECDH
9. ECDHB571
10. ECDHK571
11. ECDHP521
12. ECDSA
13. ECDSAB571
14. ECDSAP521
15. HMAC
16. MD4
17. MD5
18. RC2
19. RC2-CBC
20. RC4
A.3 CNN Classifier Results
Here we present the training and validations results
of the attacker Eve’s application classifier. As seen in
the Figure 6, when the number of samples per class
is increased gradually from 100 to 30000, validation
accuracy saturates in fewer epochs.
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Figure 6: Results of the CNN classifier trained using varying number of samples per class, 100, 300, 1000,
3000 and 10000 in order. As the number of samples increase, number of epochs to achieve high accuracy
decreases.
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Figure 7: Results of the CNN classifier trained for OpenSSL version detection using varying number of HPCs.
When trained with only a single HPC trace, the validation accuracy saturates at 81%. When more HPCs are
used, validation accuracy increases to 99%.
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